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Centre de la sécurité
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State-Sponsored Russian Media Leverages Meliorator Software for Foreign Malign Influence Activity

Summary

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), in partnership with the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Netherlands Police (DNP), and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), (hereinafter referred to as the authoring organizations) are releasing this advisory to warn social media companies that Russian state-sponsored actors have leveraged the covert Meliorator software for foreign malign influence activity benefiting the Russian Government.

Affiliates of RT (formerly Russia Today), a Russian state-sponsored media organization, used Meliorator—a covert artificial intelligence (AI) enhanced software package—to create fictitious online personas, representing a number of nationalities, to post content on X (formerly Twitter). Using this tool, RT affiliates disseminated disinformation to and about a number of countries, including the United States, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, and Israel.

Although the tool was only identified on X, the authoring organizations' analysis of Meliorator indicated the developers intended to expand its functionality to other social media platforms. The authoring organizations' analysis also indicated the tool is capable of the following:

- Creating authentic appearing social media personas en masse;
- Deploying content similar to typical social media users;
- Mirroring disinformation of other bot personas;
- Perpetuating the use of pre-existing false narratives to amplify malign foreign influence; and
- Formulating messages, to include the topic and framing, based on the specific archetype of the bot.

To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact [your local FBI field office](#). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

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The authoring organizations encourage social media companies to leverage the information in this advisory to assist with identifying fictitious personas to reduce Russian malign foreign influence activity.

For additional information, see U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) [press release](#) Justice Department and International and Private Sector Partners Disrupt Covert Russian Government-Operated Social Media Bot Farm. For more information on Russia state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see the [Russia Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories](#) webpage.

Technical Details

Meliorator

As early as 2022, RT had access to Meliorator, an AI-enabled bot farm generation and management software to disseminate disinformation to and about a number of countries, including the United States, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, and Israel. Meliorator was designed to be used on social media networks to create “authentic” appearing personas en masse, allowing for the propagation of disinformation, which could assist Russia in exacerbating discord and trying to alter public opinion as part of information operations. As of June 2024, Meliorator only worked on X (formerly known as Twitter). However, additional analysis suggests the software’s functionality would likely be expanded to other social media networks.

To provide this functionality, Meliorator includes an administrator panel called “Brigadir” and a seeding tool called “Taras.” In order to access Meliorator, users would connect by means of a virtual network computing (VNC) connection. Using Redmine software (which supports 49 languages, is multi-platform, and can be used cross-database) for project management, developers hosted Meliorator at `dtxt.mlrt[.]com`.

Brigadir

Brigadir serves as the primary end user interface of Meliorator and functions as the administrator panel. Brigadir serves as the graphical user interface for the Taras application and includes tabs for “souls,” false identities that would create the basis for the bots, and “thoughts,” which are the automated scenarios or actions that could be implemented on behalf of the bots, such as sharing content to social media in the future.

Taras

“Taras” serves as the back end of the Meliorator software package containing `.json` files used to control the personas sowing disinformation on social media. These files are highly decentralized code, which need to be combined with other files upon execution in order to achieve the desired functionality. Two specific files are vital to the functionality of Taras. The first file is designed to aggregate a number of other tools and databases for their use (Figure 1). The second (Figure 2) is designed to aggregate and execute a number of automation tools used by Meliorator.

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Logging In

Operators of Taras use the “thoughts” tab to log in to already existing bot farm personas. Once a “soul” is live on the social media platform, the identity card for the persona presents a login screen for the social media platform.




Figure 6: Technical Details Diagram

Bot Characteristics, Capabilities, and Sophistication

Characteristics

To avoid detection in the course of their online activity, each bot account is created with one of three different functions in mind. Using the Souls tab, the persona is generated for specific archetypes which then stay with the bot throughout its lifespan. The first bot archetype gets complete profiles consisting of a profile photo, cover photo, and biographical data, including name and location. These bots also have small biographies indicating their political leanings or ideologies. If a bot has this information, they will be used

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heavily to propagate information and will conduct the most robust activity. Profile photos for the bots were generated using AI technologies. In these instances, the tool used an open source available tool called Faker to generate photos, biographical information, and other details. (See Figure 7 for the code used in the tool related to Faker). A second bot archetype contains very little information on its profile, if any. Usually, the profile consists of a user name and very little original content, and is used to “like” already shared information. The final bot archetype was created using data compiled by a webcrawler associated with the Nemezida (variant nemez1da) website or by other data repositories to create an authentic appearing persona with no AI-ties. This bot appears real by generating a lot of activity and garnering followers. Of all the bot archetypes, this bot persona appears the most legitimate and is used to mirror and amplify disinformation shared by bot and non-bot accounts.

```
fromTemplate(templ) {
  faker_1.faker.locale = templ.locale;
  this.gender = faker_1.faker.helpers.arrayElement(templ.gender);
  this.firstName = faker_1.faker.name.firstName(this.gender);
  this.middleName = faker_1.faker.name.middleName(this.gender);
  this.lastName = faker_1.faker.name.lastName(this.gender);
  const nowY = new Date().getFullYear();
  const startDate = new Date(nowY - templ.age[1], 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
  const endDate = new Date(nowY - templ.age[0], 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
  this.birthDate = faker_1.faker.date.between(startDate, endDate);
  const location = faker_1.faker.helpers.arrayElement(templ.location);
  this.country = location.country;
  this.city = location.city;
  this.region = location.region;
  this.ipFrom = this.country;
  const slug = this.slugify();
  const eml = faker_1.faker.helpers.arrayElement(['otanmail.com', 'mlrtr.com']);
  this.socials.email = {
    login: `${slug}@${eml}`,
    password: faker_1.faker.internet.password(8),
    status: SocialStatus.Active
  };
  this.socials.tw = {
    login: slug,
    password: faker_1.faker.internet.password(8),
    status: SocialStatus.New
  };
  this.about = this.generateBio(templ.social.tw.bio);
  this.template = templ;
}
generateBio(src) {
  const result = new Array();
  src.forEach((group) => {
    const usedSubgroups = new Array();
    group.forEach((item) => {
```

Figure 7: Truncated json language incorporating Publicly Available Faker API to Create Personas

Sophistication

Bot persona accounts make obvious attempts to avoid bans for terms of service violations and avoid being noticed as bots by blending into the larger social media environment. The majority of accounts being followed by the bot personas boasted more than 100,000 followers, which would be necessary for a bot persona to avoid detection when interacting with other accounts. Additionally, much like authentic

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accounts, these bots follow genuine accounts reflective of their political leanings and interests listed in their biography. Exceptions to the 100,000 follower rule included following the accounts of other bots and/or highly-publicized accounts which would make sense for an individual interested in US politics to follow, such as well-known politicians. The tool is capable of receiving and replying to direct messages but generally tries to avoid doing so in order to limit the need to respond in real time.

Capabilities

The identified bot personas associated with the Meliorator tool are capable of the following:

- Deploying content similar to typical social media users, such as generating original posts, following other users, “liking,” commenting, reposting, and obtaining followers;
- Mirroring disinformation of other bot personas through their messaging, replies, reposts, and biographies;
- Perpetuating the use of pre-existing false narratives to amplify Russian disinformation; and
- Formulating messaging, to include the topic and framing, based on the specific archetype of the bot.

Obfuscation Techniques

The creators of the Meliorator tool considered a number of barriers to detection and attempted to mitigate those barriers by coding within the tool the ability to obfuscate their IP, bypass dual factor authentication, and change the user agent string.

Operators avoid detection by using a backend code designed to auto-assign a proxy IP address to the AI generated persona based on their assumed location. The developer wrote a portion of code to check and see if a proxy and specific port is located in a MongoDB specified in the same code. If not, it then finds an open active IP given a country code value. See Figure 8.

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Table 2: SLL Certificates Affiliated with the Meliorator tool's mlrtr domain

SSL Certificate	Not Observed Before	Not Used After
dc11acd4828e26bef70775f462a96f58e73f45e4	16 June 2023	24 September 2023
ab16d497ad579d345f456d5bddd8804cf2256aee	22 April 2024	21 July 2024
45c9630bab90d069bf5adfb87f810a49219e8f65	22 April 2024	21 July 2024

Table 3: Mail Server Domains Affiliated with the Meliorator Tool's mlrtr domain

Mail Server	Not Observed Before	Not Used After
cloud3.cloudmailin.net	21 April 2022	03 June 2022
cloud2.cloudmailin.net	21 April 2022	03 June 2022
cloud1.cloudmailin.net	21 April 2022	03 June 2022
mlrtr.com	03 June 2022	Present

Table 4: IP Addresses Affiliated with otanmail.com

IP Address	First Observed	Active Since	Last Observed	Observed Between
62.113.116[.]129	05 July 2023	22 November 2022	31 December 2023	05 July 2023 - 31 December 2023
46.149.78[.]21	12 January 2024	28 November 2022	13 April 2024	12 January 2024 - 13 April 2024
162.255.119[.]97	24 June 2023	28 January 2011	03 July 2023	24 June 2023 - 03 July 2023

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Table 5: SLL Certificates Affiliated with Meliorator Tool's otanmail domain

SSL Certificate	Not Observed Before	Not Used After
64adc0b01c3d2c18c557565b383713f783d37b1e	25 August 2023	23 November 2023

Table 6: Mail Server Domains Affiliated with the Meliorator Tool's otanmail domain

Mail Server	Not Observed Before	Not Used After
Otanmail[.]com	10 January 2024	Present
mx.otanmail[.]com	05 July 2023	10 January 2021
eforward1.registrar-servers[.]com	24 June 2023	05 July 2023
eforward3.registrar-servers[.]com	24 June 2023	05 July 2023
eforward5.registrar-servers[.]com	24 June 2023	05 July 2023
eforward2.registrar-servers[.]com	24 June 2023	05 July 2023
eforward4.registrar-services[.]com	24 June 2023	05 July 2023

Mitigations

The authoring organizations recommend social media organizations implement the mitigations below to reduce the impact of Russian state-sponsored actors using their platforms in disinformation campaigns.

- Consider implementing processes to validate that accounts are created and operated by a human person who abides by the platform’s respective terms of use. Such processes could be similar to well-established Know Your Customer guidelines.
- Consider reviewing and making upgrades to authentication and verification processes based on the information provided in this advisory;
- Consider protocols for identifying and subsequently reviewing users with known-suspicious user agent strings;
- Consider making user accounts Secure by Default by using default settings such as MFA, default settings that support privacy, removing personally identifiable information shared without consent, and clear documentation of acceptable behavior.

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RESOURCES

For additional information on how to combat foreign malign influence and on disinformation, see:

- [FBI's Protected Voices](#),
- [Risk in Focus: Generative A.I. and the 2024 Election Cycle](#), and
- [Securing Election Infrastructure against the Tactics of Foreign Malign Influence Operations](#).

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Version History

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